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Too Weak to Be Controlled: Judicial Review of ACER Soft Law 
 
Oana Stefan, King’s College London 
Marina Petri, Bocconi University, Milan
 
1 Introduction1 
Energy is an area of shared competences between the EU and its Member States. With 
Member States retaining large powers, regulation was, for a long time, left to informal 
networks of stakeholders who played a key role in coordinating policies. Following the 
introduction of Art 194 TFEU in the Lisbon Treaty, the third energy package builds on these 
informal arrangements and delegates regulatory and enforcement powers to public national 
regulators and to private transmission system operators (TSOs). These are organized in 
networks coordinated by the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). ACER 
carries out tasks meant essentially to enhance cooperation between the different public and 
private players, while also having a monitoring function, and decision-making power in 
technical areas.  
Given the complexities of regulation briefly hinted to above, energy has been an excellent 
terrain for the development of various non-legally binding tools – or soft law. The literature 
has already shown the many ways in which soft law has been prominent in the energy sector,2 
and has taken a stance against such instruments, arguably enacted ‘outside the legislative 
arena of democratic politics.’3 This paper is concerned more specifically with soft law issued 
by ACER, which is a good case study for an underlying tension regarding the Meroni doctrine. 
According to a strict application of this doctrine, ACER has been delegated very limited 
decision-making powers, but issues a wide variety of soft law instruments, mostly in technical 
areas. However, under the guise of their ‘technical’ nature, some of these instruments can 
contain normative rules. This is especially problematic given that soft law has an unclear legal 
status and, as a consequence, ACER often escapes judicial oversight, potentially undermining 
accountability and the balance of powers. The analysis is placed in the wider context of the 
debates concerning the Energy Union, and the institutional developments introduced in the 
                                                          
1 This article is based on the research of Oana Stefan. Marina Petri primarily contributed to the writing of Part 2, 
she assisted with parts of the research, and the article was jointly edited. Many thanks for useful comments the 
participants to the workshop Soft Law Before the European Courts: Discovering a Common Pattern? 19-20 
November 2015, Brussels, to the participants to the Energy panel of the 2017 SLS Conference, UCD Dublin, to 
Mariolina Eliantonio, Emilia Korkea-aho, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts. 
2 B Eberlein, ‘Regulation by Cooperation: The “Third Way” in Making Rules for the Internal Energy Market’, in P 
Cameron (ed), Legal Aspects of EU Energy Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 59. 
3 B Eberlein, ‘The Making of the European Energy Market: The Interplay of Governance and Government’ (2008) 
28 Journal of Public Policy 73. 
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recent Winter Package.4 The paper will offer an overview on delegation in the energy sector 
and discuss the role of ACER before delving into the analysis of specific soft law instruments 
developed by the Agency and their justiciability. 
2 Energy: sharing of competences and the role of ACER 
Regulation in the energy sector should focus, in principle, on the so-called energy triangle:5 
harmoniously combining security of supply, competition, and environmental protection. 
Competence is shared between the EU and the Member States,6 while Member States retain 
the right to determine the conditions for the exploitation of energy resources, as well as the 
choice between those resources and the general structure of energy supply.7 In addition, the 
Union contributes to the development of trans-European networks in the area of energy 
infrastructures.8 Regard needs to be had to legal principles, notably the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality,9 with the current regulatory framework leaving a lot of 
discretion to the Member States.10 
However, it is not entirely clear how the competences are shared between the EU and the 
Member States11 in this sector situated at the intersection between various policies such as 
competition, state aid, environment, security and international relations. As in all sensitive 
sectors, the strategy of the European Commission has been to counter the failure to 
harmonize and the ensuing regulatory gap through promoting informal harmonization by 
transnational regulatory networks.12 The creation of national regulatory authorities in energy 
was pushed through three liberalization packages, and, by 2005, there was at least one NRA 
in each Member State.13 The tasks entrusted to them included monitoring rules on 
interconnection and unbundling, and network access; approving terms and conditions 
(including tariffs) for new producers, and the conditions for connection and access to the 
network. The Third energy package14 also provided for reinforced cooperation between the 
                                                          
4 Winter Package ‘Clean Energy for All Europeans – unlocking Europe's growth potential’ available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-clean-energy-
transition (the Winter Package). 
5 According to the policy developments enshrined in the European energy strategy and Energy Union. See, ex 
multis, Communication from the Commission “Clean Energy For All Europeans”, COM(2016) 860 final, 30th 
November 2016. 
6 Article 4(2)(i) TEU. 
7 Article 194 TFEU. 
8 Article 170 TFEU 
9 Article 5(3) TEU and  Article 5(4) TEU respectively. 
10 K Talus, EU Energy Law and Policy A Critical Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 109. 
11 E Thompson, ‘The European Union's Energy Policy: Two Track Development’ in N Witzleb, AM Arranz and P 
Winand (eds), The European Union and Global Engagement: Institutions, Policies and Challenges (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 178. 
12 B Eberlein and E Grande, ‘Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes and the eu regulatory state’ 
(2005) 12 JEPP 89, 100. 
13 C W Jones and W Webster, EU Energy Law, The Internal Energy Market 3rd edn (Leuven: Claeys & Casteels, 
2010) 111-112. 
14 The Third energy package comprises the following legislative interventions: Directive 2009/72/EC (hereinafter: 
the “Electricity Directive"), OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 55–93; Directive 2009/73/EC (hereinafter: the “Gas Directive") 
OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 94–136; Regulation (EC) 713/2009 (hereinafter: the “Agency Regulation") OJ L 126, 
21.5.2009, 13–22, Regulation (EC) 714/2009 (hereinafter: the “Electricity Regulation"), OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 15–
35, and Regulation (EC) 715/2009 (the “Gas Regulation") OJ L 211, 14.8.2009, 36–54. Moreover, additional 
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transmission system operators, through the creation of European networks of transmission 
system operators for gas (ENTSOg) and electricity (ENTSOe). 
The initial voluntary cooperation between national regulators has been relatively formalized, 
over the years, culminating with the creation of ACER in 2011.15 ACER fulfills several roles. It 
provides a platform for cooperation for NRAs and TSOs, which, as expressly articulated under 
the legislation, should lead to the creation of a common regulatory regime to deal with cross 
border issues.16 To fulfill this cooperative rule, ACER has the power to make non-binding 
recommendations. ACER monitors the work of the NRAs and the TSOs but it cannot veto 
actions by these entities given the strict and careful application of the Meroni doctrine.17 ACER 
has been given decisional powers only on technical issues18 and on a case by case basis, all 
under the control of the European Commission. In this connection, one should note that the 
line between what is technical and what is normative is fairly thin, as technical standards could 
contain rules of conduct. ACER advises the NRAs in its areas of competence and can make 
recommendations to help share good practices. The NRAs report annually to ACER on their 
activities and ACER can provide assistance if an NRA has difficulties in applying the 
guidelines.19 This can take the form of legal economic and technical assistance in relation to 
energy regulation.20 Furthermore, ACER might be requested to deliver opinions on the 
compliance of decisions taken by the NRAs with the energy regulatory framework. Under the 
REMIT Regulation (which deals with monitoring market integrity and transparency, in order to 
detect eventual market manipulation), ACER is responsible with gathering and centralizing 
information, while enforcement powers rest with the NRAs21.  
Given the fuzzy boundaries of shared competences and the inherent tensions between the 
aims of the policy, regulation has developed, in energy, as a result of the relationship between 
ACER, the Commission, and the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs)22, with TSOs playing 
                                                          
normative texts included in the mentioned process are:  Regulation (EU) 1227/2011 (hereinafter: “REMIT 
Regulation”), OJ L 326, 8.12.2011, 1–16,  Regulation (EU) 994/2010 (hereinafter: “the Regulation on security of 
gas supply”, which ceased its validity on 31st October 2017), OJ L 295, 12.11.2010, 1–22, Regulation (EU) 
838/2010 (hereinafter: the “ITC Regulation”), OJ L 250, 24.9.2010, 5–11, and Regulation (EU) 347/2013 
(hereinafter: “the TEN-E Regulation”), OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, 39–75. 
15 Commission Decision of 16th May 2011 (OJ C 146, 17.5.2011, 3–4), repealing Decision 2003/796/EC of 11th 
November 2003 (OJ L 296, 14.11.2003, 34–35). 
16 Article 38 of the Electricity Directive, Article 42 of the Gas Directive. 
17 S Lavrijssen, and L Hancher, European Regulators in the Network Sectors: Revolution or Evolution? (June 2008), 
TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2008-024, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1162164 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1162164, 6 (last checked: 23rd February 2018). 
18 For example, these include network codes, certification of TSOs, provision of information, rules for the trading 
of electricity and rules on investment incentives for the construction of inter-connector capacity under the Third 
Package, as well as decisions on investment requests, including cross-border cost allocation under the TEN-E 
Regulation. 
19 Articles 7(4) and 7(6) of the Agency Regulation. 




21 See Recilal 15 and Article 1 of the REMIT Regulation. 
22In S Lavrijssen and I Bordel, ‘ACER: demystifying the European energy regulator from a consumer perspective’ 
(2012) 10(5) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 6, the concept of “triangular relationship” is used to emphasise 
the controversial relationship between the EU energy actors in enforcing the conflicting consumer interests in 
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an important role. Consequently, ACER is an atypical actor within the EU network agency 
landscape. Defined a “highly advanced example of European composite administration”23, the 
Agency combines, both according to the relevant provisions of the Agency Regulation and with 
reference to its internal practice, a variegated approach in terms of NRAs involvement in the 
decision-making process. Its organisation neither follows the traditional EU agency template,24 
nor the models adopted in other contexts that share similar economic characteristics to the 
energy sector, such as telecommunications. While ACER has been tagged as a network agency, 
given that it gathers representatives of national regulatory agencies in its Board of 
Regulators,25 it has a dual nature, both European and national. ACER’s internal governance 
mechanisms reflect this dual nature, and ACER’s Board of Regulators has both a propulsive 
and a supervisory role with regards to the Director and the Administrative Board. In practice,  
it is often the Director, and not the Board of Regulators who formulates concrete proposals. 
The Board of Regulators mainly operates as a body which only approves the proposals of the 
Director or vetoes them. Given these distinctive features, ACER is an interesting case study 
with regards to EU agency decision making. However, these peculiarities also suggest that 
conclusions of a case study on ACER cannot be extended to other EU agencies without further 
research. 
Following the Meroni doctrine, the delegation of powers in the European Union should follow 
a set of rules, namely an authority cannot delegate powers that it does not have; delegated 
powers should be expressly stated; delegation needs to be necessary; finally, the exercise of 
delegated powers should be subject to review, and the delegation of discretionary powers is 
prohibited. 26 Short Selling27 clarifies that the delegation doctrine applies to agencies and 
indicates a certain relaxation of the above rules, especially in relation to financial sector. In 
the case of ACER, research shows that the (original) Meroni doctrine has played an important 
role in confining ACER’s competences, against the Commission’s initial proposal,28 to 
supporting and to coordinating the NRAs in performing their functions at the EU level. Thus, 
ACER carries out some complementary regulatory tasks alongside national authorities. The 
Agency relies on soft law and the voluntary cooperation of NRAs, while its binding decision-
making power depends largely on the request of national regulators or their failure to take a 
decision within a certain time frame. The Commission voiced concerns as to the lack of powers 
of ACER to enable it to effectively contribute to EU energy market integration and the Energy 
                                                          
this sector. Notably, the idea of “triangular relationship” is borrowed from P Larouche and M de Visser, ‘The 
triangular relationship between the Commisson, NRAs and National Courts revisited‘ (2006) 64 TILEC discussion 
paper, Communications and Strategies 125- 145. 
23 J Schneider, ‘Energy and trans-European Networks’, in H C Hoffman, G C Rowe and A H Türk (eds.), 
Administrative law and policy of the European Union (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015) 354. 
24 Common Approach on EU decentralised agencies, July 2012, available at https://europa.eu/european-
union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/joint_statement_and_common_approach_2012_en.pdf. (last checked: 
26th February 2018). 
25 S Lavrijssen and L Hancher, ‘Networks on Track: From European Regulatory Networks to European Regulatory 
‘Network Agencies’’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 23. 
26 Case C - 10/56 Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel 
Community [1958] EU:C:1958:7.  
27 Case C - 270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union [2014] EU:C:2014:18. 
28 F Ermacora, ‘The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)’, in C W Jones and W Webster, EU 
Energy Law, The Internal Energy Market 3rd edn (Leuven: Claeys & Casteels, 2010). 
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Union.29 Recently, the Commission proposed new reforms to the energy sector through a 
‘Winter Package’. The powers of ACER are increased only to a limited extent, due mainly to 
staffing and budgetary concerns, as well as a danger to concentrate expertise within the 
Agency. 30 Accordingly, soft law is likely to remain the Agency’s core regulatory tool. Indeed, 
while ‘hardening’ the nature of the legal instruments issued by ACER could strengthen its role 
as a center of policy making and also enhance the potential for judicial review, the Agency 
structurally lacks the political and institutional legitimacy to act as a supranational regulator. 
Moreover, the shaky legal basis of such a shift, as well as the difficult balance of shared 
competences between the Union and the Member States are strong arguments against a 
significant upgrade of ACER’s powers.31 
3 Soft law in energy regulation 
Studying EU energy soft law is important from several points of view. First, the centrality of 
energy infrastructure in the expansion of the European project needs to be acknowledged, as 
well as the specificity of the sector. The regulatory structure and evolution of the energy 
market design presents some relevant discrepancies with regards to other regulated markets 
that share a comparable economic and technological structure, such as telecoms32. Second, 
EU energy law provides a unique perspective over the evolution of multilevel governance in 
Europe, as the creation of an internal energy market required policy makers to balance 
competition and coordination of the players involved.33 Soft law is key to this balancing 
exercise, as it integrates traditional law making with the flexibility required by the context. 
Third, EU energy soft law plays a paramount role in accommodating structural divergences 
between regulatory cultures34 at the national and the European level. More precisely, soft law 
helps bridging the regulatory gap between national administrations, as its implementation 
often requires a homogeneous engagement effort at national level. Soft law thus becomes a 
valuable liberalisation and integration instrument with regards to cross-border issues. Fourth, 
the trilateral relationship between ACER, the Commission, and the NRAs represents an 
intrinsic characteristic of the energy sector, where the shift of regulatory powers to the 
                                                          
29 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic And Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment Bank A 
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 
final, 9. 
30 Proposal for a Regulation  of the European Parliament and the Council on the Governance of the Energy Union 
(hereinafter: “Proposal for a Governance Regulation”), amending Directive 94/22/EC, Directive 98/70/EC, 
Directive 2009/31/EC, Regulation (EC) No 663/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Directive 2009/73/EC, Council 
Directive 2009/119/EC, Directive 2010/31/EU, Directive 2012/27/EU, Directive 2013/30/EU and Council Directive 
(EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013, COM/2016/0759 final/2 - 2016/0375 (COD). See in 
particular the Explanatory Memorandum, 2 - 11. 
31 “Proposal for a Governance Regulation”, Explanatory Memorandum, 2 - 11. 
32 D Levi-Faur, ‘The Governance of competition: the interplay of technology, economics, and politics in European 
Union electricity and telecom regimes’ (1999) 19 Journal of public policy 175-207. 
33 E Brousseau and J Glachant, ‘Regulators as reflective governance platforms’ (2011) 12(3) Competition and 
Regulation in Network Industries 195.  




supranational institutions has led to a substantial increase in the competences of NRAs, in 
terms of implementation and single case decision-making.  
The Commission issues a wide range of soft law that affect the regulation of the energy 
market, both in the form of sector-specific interpretative texts and through distinctive pieces 
of legislation that have a hybrid nature. One example of interpretative guidelines is the 2014 
State aid Guidelines on Energy and the Environment,35 an instrument tackling energy from a 
competition policy (State aid) perspective. This is an Art 288 TFEU instrument that, according 
to established case law,36 should be binding on the discretion of the Commission. The Court 
will engage in judicial review if such effects are proven, which entails a number of difficulties. 
As discussed elsewhere,37 justiciability depends on who brings a case and from what level of 
European governance. For instance, the Court has not acknowledged binding effects of 
Commission State aid guidance for national authorities, even though it admitted in the same 
case the relevance of the guidance in assessing compliance of national measures with 
European law.38 The uncertain legal effects of Commission soft law and its limited justiciability 
would raise similar problems in energy as in other areas, as discussed in other articles of this 
special issue. While acknowledging these matters, the current article focuses on the soft law 
issued by ACER, given that such instruments are the main tools available to the Agency when 
discharging its duties. 
A case study of ACER soft law would advance knowledge on the role that soft law plays in 
European energy governance, and the accountability problems the recourse to such 
instruments might entail. The predominantly ‘soft’ powers of the Agency are connected to a 
strict interpretation of the Meroni doctrine. Yet, if one is to take the doctrine seriously (as also 
developed in Short Selling), an important component thereof concerns accountability, 
institutional balance, and, more specifically, judicial review. Or, with ACER operating, through 
soft powers, a delicate balance between its interlocutors, be them public (such as the 
Commission and the NRAs) or private (such as the transmission system operators), one may 
wonder to whom is ACER accountable, who is accountable to ACER and for what.39 The Agency 
Regulation contains some limited mechanisms40 for ensuring accountability towards the EU 
                                                          
35 Communication from the Commission — Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 
2014-2020, OJ C 200, 28.6.2014, 1–55. 
36 Case C-311/94 IJssel-Vliet v. Minister van Economische Zaken [1996] EU:C:1996:383, and Joined Cases C-189, 
202, 205, 208 & 213/02 Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] EU:C:2005:408. 
37 O Stefan ‘Helping Loose Ends Meet? The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft Law as a Tool of Multi-Level 
Governance’ (2014) 21(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 359-379. 
38 Case C - 526/14, Tadej Kotnik and Others v Državni zbor Republike Slovenije [2016] EU:C:2016:570. 
39 Accountability difficulties are common to network agencies – see S Lavrijssen and L Hancher, ‘Networks on 
Track: From European Regulatory Networks to European Regulatory ‘Network Agencies’’ (2009) 36 Legal Issues 
of Economic Integration 23. 
40 According to the Regulation, several layers of accountability are defined with regards to ACER. The Agency is 
accountable both on budgetary and financial matters (Art. 24). The European Ombudsman may also be involved 
in compliant proceedings in front of the Court of Justice, and it thus plays a supervisory role (Art. 30). More 
importantly, the Regulation spells out a series of reporting obligations, both in terms of independent evaluation 
and in terms of regulatory reporting activities. For its monitoring role in relation to the ENTSOs and the NRAs, 
ACER is accountable to the Commission. Moreover, the Director and the Chairman of the Board of Regulators 
are periodically heard by the European Parliament (more on this on ACER “towards an internal energy market 
for the benefit of all EU consumers”, communication strategy 2014-2015). This multifaceted set of mechanisms, 
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Parliament, the Council and the Commission,41 and it sets out the roles of the boards where 
the interests of the Union and of its MS (Administrative Board) and of the regulator (Board of 
Regulators) are represented42. However, partially due to the increasingly technical nature of 
the regulated matters, the Board of Regulators is less and less involved in the proposal and 
adoption of regulatory outputs, increasing the accountability gap. The Agency Regulation 
provides also for the creation of an internal Board of Appeal, comprising six members and six 
alternates selected from among current or former senior staff of the NRAs, NCAs, or other 
national or Union institutions with relevant experience in the energy sector. While there is 
some provision for a member not to sit where there is a conflict of interest, the Board of 
Appeal is not a judicial body in terms of membership although it carries out a judicial role. It 
provides an evaluation by peers whose decisions can then be challenged before the EU Court 
of Justice. Nevertheless, as analyzed in Section 4.3.1 below, the Board of Appeal does not 
review acts of non-legally binding nature issued by the Agency. 
In this context of fuzzy accountability, the present paper focuses on the lack of judicial review 
of soft law issued by ACER. As developed in Romano,43 judicial review of delegated powers is 
an important component of the Meroni doctrine, with the Court reinstating this point also in 
Short Selling.44 The fact that ACER issues mostly instruments deprived of legally binding force 
means that judicial oversight is inexistent. Herein lies the conundrum that this paper is set to 
unveil. Hardening ACER’s decision-making powers would inevitable sit uneasily with the 
Meroni doctrine, and the tenet that only non-discretionary powers can be delegated. 
However, confining ACER’s powers means that the soft law instruments issued by the Agency 
might not be justiciable, hence undermining another tenet of the doctrine, which is 
accountability – and more generally the balance of powers.45 While judicial review is not a 
panacea for modern ills of regulation, the analysis below will show that there exists, currently, 
a mismatch between the potentially wide practical effects of the instruments issued by ACER 
and the very limited avenues for redress against such instruments. In this regard, ACER soft 
law is no different from other instruments analysed by this special issue – or indeed the 
literature on soft law of other European agencies.46 
                                                          
however structurally articulated, does not provide a satisfactory answer to the “accountability dilemma” with 
regards to ACER. Arguably, the mentioned move from ERGEG to ACER has not represented a significant step 
forward in terms of accountability, as the ex post tools enshrined in the Regulation do not provide for an 
adequate level of protection to the actors involved, and they are not specific enough in nature. More 
substantially, the pervasive effects of the acts issued by ACER need to be counterbalanced by a structural and 
systematic review process, rather than merely being included in extensive reports to be presented to Parliament. 
41 Agency Regulation, Recital 24: “the Agency should be accountable to the European Parliament, the Council 
and the Commission, where appropriate”. 
42 Articles 3, 12 and 14 of the Agency Regulation.  
43 Case C - 98/80 Giuseppe Romano v Institut national d'assurance maladie-invalidité [1981], EU:C:1981:104. 
44 Case C - 270/12 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union [2014] EU:C:2014:18, 46 – 53.  
45 For a detailed analysis of the balance of powers in the adoption of electricity network codes see S. Lavrijssen 
and T. Kohlbacher, EU Electricity Network Codes: Good Governance in a Network of Networks (January 8, 
2018). TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2018-001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3098081 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3098081, accessed 12/07/2018 
46 See, inter alia, M van Rijsbergen, ‘On the Enforceability of EU Agencies’ Soft Law at the National Level: The 
Case of the European Securities and Markets Authority’ (2014) 10(5) Utrecht Law Review 116 – 131; E Chiti, 
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4 Justiciability of ACER Soft Law Instruments 
4.1 Setting the scene 
The Lisbon Treaty modified the list of acts that can be reviewed in Court to include also EU 
agencies (Article 263 (1) TFEU). Therefore, from the point of view of authorship at least, 
judicial review of instruments issued by ACER is possible. Of course, instruments issued by the 
networks of transmission system operators are much more problematic in this regard, as the 
European networks of transmission system operators for gas (ENTSOg) and electricity 
(ENTSOe) cannot be considered EU bodies. From a justiciability point of view, the most 
important problem raised by acts issued by agencies such as ACER is the lack of legal effects – 
as interpreted by the case law of EU Courts.47 In this regard, one can note a mismatch between 
the actual effects of such instruments and the readiness of the EU Court to acknowledge 
them.48  
The range of effects entailed by soft law is wide. These can be of practical49 or of legal nature,50 
but remain rather uncertain from the point of view of (traditional) law, absent the legally 
binding force of the instrument. Despite this lack of legally binding force, the effects of soft 
law sometimes appear binding, from a legal or even an extra-legal point of view. The problem 
is that many of the political, moral, or even social commitments might have important 
consequences, although they are considered extra-legal by the Courts and are not enforced 
as such. There are only few circumstances when EU Courts acknowledge the effects of soft 
law: if soft law introduces supplementary obligations not mentioned in hard law provisions; 
when soft law is issued by an institution as a means of structuring its discretion; finally when 
soft law becomes binding on MS as result of negotiations coupled with Treaty obligations.51 
Consequently it appears that ‘for the issue of justiciability, the distinction between soft and 
hard law remains a valid distinction, while for policy development, implementation and 
assessment, the boundaries between hard and soft are, indeed, more blurred’.52 
The soft law issued by ACER makes no exception to this brief account: while extremely relevant 
from a practical perspective, it would most likely fail to pass the necessary legal effects 
threshold that would make it relevant for a Court of law. The following sections will analyse, 
from a point of view of justiciability, several soft law instruments issued by ACER: the 
framework guidelines that form the basis of network codes, the recommendations and 
                                                          
‘European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ (2013) 19(1) European Law Journal, 93–
110; M. Simoncini, 'The Erosion of the Meroni Doctrine: The Case of the European Aviation Safety Agency' (2015) 
21 European Public Law, Issue 2, pp. 309–342. 
47 A Türk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009) 11. 
48 Based on O Stefan ‘Helping Loose Ends Meet? The Judicial Acknowledgement of Soft Law as a Tool of Multi-
Level Governance’ (2014) 21(2) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 359. 
49 ‘Formally non-binding agreements can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for the actors 
involved’ K Jacobsson, 'Soft Regulation and the Subtle Transformation of States: the Case of EU Employment 
Policy' (2004) 14 Journal of European Social Policy 359. 
50 A comprehensive list can be found in F Snyder ‘The Use of Legal Acts in EC Agricultural Policy’ in G Winter (ed.) 
Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
1996) 463. 
51 J Scott, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48 
Common Market Law Review 329. 
52 C de la Porte and P Pochet, ‘Why and how (still) study the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)?’ (2012) 22 
Journal of European Social Policy 339. 
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opinions addressed to NRAs and TSOs, as well as the guidance issued under the REMIT 
regulation. The analysis will inevitably be abstract at times, as there is little EU case law in this 
regard. The choice of instruments was dictated by the fact that they all have a legal basis 
within secondary legislation and fit the definition of soft law as ‘rules of conduct which, in 
principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects’ and 
also legal effects.53 Besides the above, ACER issues a variety of other documents, such as 
monitoring reports, work programmes, or, in the case of REMIT, a ‘reporting user package’, 
staff letters, Q&A and FAQ, and a newsletter.54 Leaving aside the debate with regards to the 
legal effects of these documents,55 suffice is to note here that the variety of instruments is 
impressive, and an indication of the ‘dysfunctional differentiation’56 of post-legislative 
guidance by EU agencies. 
4.2 Framework guidelines which form the basis of Network Codes 
Framework Guidelines and Network Codes are instruments that provide rules for cross-border 
exchanges of energy. The sectors in which these can be adopted are listed in Art 8 (6) of the 
Electricity and Gas Regulations and include among others network security and reliability, 
network connection, third-party access, capacity-allocation and congestion-management, 
transparency, balancing, etc. Following Meroni, ACER was not granted power to issue legally 
binding rules in the area of creation and implementation of network codes,57 but a procedure 
is put in place whereby ACER, the transmission system operators, and the European 
Commission participate in the elaboration of these network codes, which, subsequently, can 
(but do not have to) be made binding through comitology. The procedure starts with ACER 
being consulted by the Commission on the annual priority list identifying the areas set out in 
Article 8.6 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations, including network security and reliability 
rules, network connection rules or third party access rules. According to Article 6 of the 
Electricity and Gas Regulation, ACER needs to submit to the Commission non-binding 
framework guidelines setting out clear objectives and principles for the development of 
network codes relating to the areas identified in the priority list. In order to draft these 
framework guidelines, ACER needs to consult the ENTSOs. If the Commission is not satisfied 
with the way in which the guideline contributes to non-discrimination, effective competition 
and the efficient functioning of the market, it can request ACER to review it. If ACER does not 
submit a revision, the Commission can elaborate the guideline in question.  
Subsequently, network codes are elaborated under Article 6 of the Electricity and Gas 
Regulations by the ENTSOs, at the request of the Commission. The Agency issues an opinion 
on the network code, and may ask the ENTSO to amend and resubmit its code. When the 
Agency is satisfied that the code is in line with the guideline, the Agency shall submit the 
                                                          
53 Snyder, F. 'The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques'. In 
Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: Structures for Indirect Rule, edited by T. Daintith. Chichester: 
John Wiley & Sons, 1995, 64. 
54 J. Godin, M. Polet, & A. Jamar De Bolsée, ‘Implementing REMIT: What a Legal Analysis Tells about the 
(Regulatory) Role of ACER’, [2018] European Journal of Risk Regulation, 9(2), 192, 201-202. 
55 See J. Godin et al, ibid, or C. Vlachou, New Governance and Regulation in the Energy Sector: What does the 
Future Hold for EU Network Codes? (2018) European Journal of Risk Regulation, 9(2), 268. 
56 S Vaughan, ‘Differentiation and Dysfunction: An Exploration of Post-Legislative Guidance Practices in 14 EU 
Agencies’ (2015), Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 17, 66-91 
57 Some increased powers in this regard are provided for in the Winter Package. 
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network code to the Commission and may recommend that it be adopted within a reasonable 
time period. The Commission might ask ACER to prepare the network code itself if the ENTSO 
did not manage to develop a network code within the deadline. Failing this, the Commission 
might draft the code itself. Finally, the Commission is supposed to adopt the code through 
comitology.58 If this happens, the code becomes binding, if not, it remains non-binding. Non-
binding codes can be elaborated also by the ENTOs. These need to be submitted to ACER for 
an opinion. 
In a recent review of the EU Electricity Network Codes, Lavrijssen and Kohlbacher noted that 
the whole process suffers from important drawbacks from the point of view of good 
governance principles and accountability.59 For the purposes of this article, we are mostly 
interested in the triggering ‘soft law’ component of the procedure, namely the framework 
guidelines. They might be considered ‘steering instruments’60 or ‘programming legislation’61 
according to certain classifications of soft law. These are legal and/or political instruments 
with the objective to steer or guide action in a legally non-binding way by laying down ‘new 
rules independently of an existing legal framework, or […] adopted in the context of such a 
framework, prior to, simultaneous with or subsequent to legislation,’62 hence adding to 
existing acts. Even if these guidelines are not made binding at a later stage, they are of vital 
importance for the subsequent elaboration of network codes by the ENTSOs. In fact, ACER 
needs to evaluate the network codes elaborated by the operators in the light of the guidelines, 
as well as in light of principles revolving around effective competition, security of supply, and 
sustainability.63 In turn, the network codes elaborated in accordance with the guidelines will 
take precedence over relevant national codes or international standards and regulations. 
An analysis of the way in which the process is conducted shows the relevance of the 
framework guidelines in the drafting of the network codes. For instance, following a number 
of public consultations and amendments suggested by the European Commission, ACER 
adopted in March 2014 the Framework Guidelines on rules regarding harmonised 
transmission tariff structures for gas ('Tariff FG')64. On this basis, ENTSOg was asked to 
                                                          
58 Regulatory procedure with scrutiny under Article 28(2) of the Gas Regulation and Article 23(2) of the Electricity 
Regulation. 
59 Lavrijssen and Kohlbacher, supra n 45. 
60 L Senden, Soft Law in European Community Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 157. 
61 D Chalmers, G Davies and G Monti, European Union Law Texts and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006) 137-138. 
62 L Senden, supra n 60, 157. 
63 ‘Maintaining security of supply, supporting the completion and functioning of the internal market in electricity 
and cross-border trade, including delivering benefits to the customers and facilitating the Union’s targets for 
penetration of renewable generation’ (Framework Guidelines on Capacity Allocation and Congestion 
Management for Electricity) or ‘establishing objective, fair, transparent and non-discriminatory rules for 
balancing in a cost-reflective way, and for creating appropriate incentives for network users and transmission 
system operators’ (Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing, FG-2012-E-009 18th  September 2012, 
available on ACER’s official website at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Framework_Guidelines/Framework%20
Guidelines/Framework%20Guidelines%20on%20Electricity%20Balancing.pdf, last checked on 26th February 
2018). 
64 Available on ACER’s official website at 
https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Tariffs/2013/FG%20on%20Harmonised%20Gas%20T
ransmission%20Tariff%20Structures.pdf, last checked on 26th February 2018. 
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elaborate a Draft Network Code on this issue, finally submitted to ACER in December 201465. 
The Agency commented extensively on the code, in relation to a series of ‘misalignments’ with 
the Framework Guidelines, and a revised version was adopted by ENTSOg in July 2015 
addressing all those issues. The opinion of ACER did not deal only with discrepancies between 
the Tariff FG and the Code, but also with mismatch between the Code and general principles 
of law, such as transparency/confidentiality. For example, the opinion points out that the draft 
Network Code inserted an inappropriately broad disclaimer in its Article 24 (2) -- “The 
confidentiality of commercially sensitive information shall be preserved”. The Agency 
considered that there are diverging views between the Tariff FG and the Draft Code on the 
definition of commercial sensitive information, and that the above disclaimer could have been 
used as a justification for stepping out of any one or more of the publication requirements.66 
ENTSOg complied with the opinion and removed the contested phrase from the final network 
code, to comply with the Tariff FG. Interestingly, following comitology, several provisions 
related to the confidentiality of commercially sensitive information were inserted in the final 
regulation,67 especially in relation to implementation and monitoring of the Regulation by the 
TSOs, and periodic consultation requirements.  
The example above shows that the framework guidelines are important in the adoption of 
network codes. ACER will not hesitate to amend the proposals coming from ENTSOs. At the 
same time, the committee and the Commission can also have a last word on this, and the final 
regulation can ultimately reflect the position of the TSOs, and not that of ACER. Earlier 
research, based on documented agency practice, presumed that the Commission will 
generally follow ACER’s recommendation,68 but recent examples such as the one mentioned 
above69 show that the Commission is not hesitant to change the proposed code. It follows that 
some degree of accountability to the Commission does exist, in practice. Still, judicial oversight 
of ACER’s initial framework guidelines might be interesting as, for instance, one question 
might be whether the requirements of consultation have been properly carried out by ACER.70 
The broad competence of ACER to examine network codes in relationship to general principles 
of law might be contested by the ENTSO. Furthermore, one may even question the 
appropriateness of entrusting the drafting of legislation to commercial operators.  
Such judicial review can occur following the adoption of the network codes. With regards to 
codes that become implementing regulations following comitology, judicial review of the 
guidelines on which they are based is possible, in light of Artegodan. In that case, the Court 
held that, even if an agency opinion has no binding effects, its unlawfulness must be regarded 
                                                          
65 ‘Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures for Gas - ENTSOG Network Code for ACER 
Reasoned Opinion’, 26th December 2014, published on ENTSOG’s official website and available at 
https://www.entsog.eu/public/uploads/files/publications/Tariffs/2014/TAR0450_141226_TAR%20NC_Final.pdf
, last checked on 25th February 2018. 
66 Opinion of The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators No 02/2015 of 26 March 2015 on the Network 
Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff Structures For Gas, p. 4. 
67 Commission Regulation (EU) 2017/460 of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on harmonised 
transmission tariff structures for gas (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L 72, 17.3.2017, 29–56 
68 S A C M Lavrijssen and I Bordei, ‘ACER: Demystifying the European Energy Supervisor from a Consumer 
Perspective’ (2012) 10(5) Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal 12. 
69 For another example concerning the Gas Capacity Allocation Mechanism Network Code see M L P Groenleer, 
‘Redundancy in Multilevel Energy Governance: Why (and When) Regulatory Overlap Can Be Valuable’ (2016), 
available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2865683. (last checked on 23rd February 2018). 
70 With regards to the importance of consultations in the drafting of network codes see C. Vlachou, supra n. 55. 
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as a breach of essential procedural requirements rendering a Commission decision based 
thereon unlawful.71 Given their status as steering instruments, the framework guidelines 
issued by ACER are more than just scientific opinions: they contain rules of conduct, and 
hence, should, a fortiori, also be subject to judicial review. However, some of the network 
codes never become binding – failing approval by the Commission – or in the case the code is 
adopted by the ENTSO on their own motion. Such codes do not have legally binding force but 
might in fact regulate the networks and affect market participants and consumers. Their 
justiciability would be limited not only by the lack of legal effects but also given their 
authorship by private undertakings organized in a network. As detailed by Lavrijssen and 
Kohlbacher, judicial review of the network codes adopted through Commission Regulation is 
not enough to ensure full judicial accountability.72 In these circumstances, the question is 
whether one can challenge in court the non-binding framework guidelines on which the non-
binding network codes were based.  
This question boils down to determining whether framework guidelines are justiciable and if 
they produce legal effects that could be recognized by a Court of law. Lavrijssen and 
Kohlbacher believe framework guidelines are not justiciable, and they make a strong case in 
this regard, discarding arguments pertaining to potential legitimate expectations of 
stakeholders.73 Yet, based on financial regulation case law, we believe that one more point 
could be brought in favor of justiciability. As recently restated in in Clearing Houses, the 
criteria used to determine the justiciability of an act are the wording, the context, the 
substance of the act, as well as the intention of its author.74 In its analysis of the wording and 
context of the act, as observed by Türk, the Court gave more importance to the perception of 
the addressee than to the intention of the author.75 Applying this same logic to the framework 
guidelines, it will be observed that their wording is quite prescriptive. For example, the 
Network Code Electricity Balancing ‘must be in line with the Framework Guidelines’ on the 
basis of which it was developed, ‘and also with the relevant EU legislation.’ Moreover, ‘the 
Agency will evaluate the Network Code on Electricity Balancing pursuant to Article 6(7) and 
(9) of the Electricity Regulation with regard to compliance with these Framework Guidelines 
and relevant EU energy legislation.’76 This excerpt shows how EU legislation is placed at the 
same level from the point of view of the binding force as the framework guidelines 
themselves. Consequently, regarding the perception of the addressees as per Clearing Houses, 
the ENTSOs have no real choice but to comply with framework guidelines when elaborating 
the codes. What is more, the intention of the author appears to be that the Guidelines should 
                                                          
71 Joined Cases T-74/00 , T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00.Artegodan GmbH 
and Others v Commission of the European Communities. [2010] EU:T:2002:283, para 197. 
72 Lavrijssen and Kohlbacher, supra n 45, 62. 
73 Ibid., 63. 
74 Case T-496/11, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Central Bank (ECB), [2015] 
EU:T:2015:133. para 31. 
75 A Türk “Liability and accountability for policies announced to the public and for press releases” in ECB Legal 
Conference 2017 Shaping a new legal order for Europe: a tale of crises and opportunities 45, available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/ecblegalconferenceproceedings201712.en.pdf?b452bb9c54dca55f
8f5673b21631a4fem, last accessed on 26th February 2018. 
76 ACER Framework Guidelines on Electricity Balancing, 5, available at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Framework_Guidelines/Framework%20
Guidelines/Framework%20Guidelines%20on%20Electricity%20Balancing.pdf consulted 27 February 2018. 
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produce binding effects. On this basis, a case might be made in favor of their justiciability 
(although standing requirements would have to be complied with too). 
If in the case of framework guidelines justiciability could be established even though it does 
require a small leap in terms of legal thinking, in the case of the recommendations and 
opinions issued by ACER – either to the NRAs or to the TSOs – establishing justiciability would 
amount to an intellectual somersault without the safety net of legal arguments. 
4.3 Recommendations to assist market players and regulators 
According to Article 7 (2) of the Agency Regulation, ACER can make recommendations to assist 
regulatory authorities and market players in sharing good practices. As Article 288 (4) TFEU 
instruments, these are not legally binding, hence, in principle, not justiciable. There are several 
types of recommendations, according to the different legal basis provided for in secondary 
legislation. 
4.3.1 Recommendations and opinions on the work of the NRAs and EU institutions 
A) Good practices 
ACER provides a platform for cooperation for NRA, which, as expressly articulated under the 
legislation, should lead to the creation of a common regulatory regime to deal with cross 
border issues, such as managing the network, providing interconnection capacity, 
coordinating the development of network codes, and managing congestion.77 In order to fulfill 
this cooperative rule, ACER has the power to make recommendations. ACER advises the NRAs 
in its areas of competence and can make recommendations to help share good practices.  
One example is the ACER Recommendation 7/201378 regarding the cross-border cost request 
submitted in the framework of the first union list of electricity and gas projects of common 
interest. The Recommendation is part of the effort to build the internal energy market by 
setting up and developing energy infrastructure. Setting up such infrastructure involves 
important cross-border work, cooperative projects and large sums of money. Through its 
Trans-European Networks for energy strategy, the EU helps identifying priorities, individual 
projects, and financing them. The TEN-E Regulation sets the ground rules for this process, 
while encouraging cooperation between NRAs. Among others, the regulation provides for the 
cross-border allocation of costs (CBCA) for projects of common interest (PCI), in order to 
ensure that such projects get appropriate funding and that all Member States that benefit 
from such projects pay their share. Determining the CBCA is done, upon request of the project 
promoters, by the NRA of the MS where the project will have the most significant economic 
impacts. ACER’s Recommendation 7/2013 is meant to ‘assist the NRAs and promoters of PCIs 
in adopting a consistent EU-wide approach to CBCA requests.’ It includes a series of technical 
                                                          
77 Article 38 of the Electricity Directive, Article 42 of the Gas Directive. 
78 Recommendation of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators No 07/2013 of 25th September 2013 
regarding the cross border cost allocation requests submitted in the framework of the first Union list of electricity 
and gas projects of common interest, available at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Recommendations/ACER%20Recomme
ndation%2007-2013.pdf, last checked on 26th February 2018. 
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specifications as to the information that is necessary to be submitted with a CBCA request as 
well as the principles that the NRAs should follow when handling such requests. The 
Recommendation invited the NRAs to take necessary measures to ensure that CBCA requests 
submitted by the project promoters are in line with the specifications of the recommendation.  
Instruments addressed to national authorities designed to achieve a harmonisation of some 
elements of national practices (such as Recommendation 7/2013) are not legally binding for 
national authorities79 and hence cannot be challenged or invoked by individuals in front of a 
court of law.80 The NRAs might decide to comply with such recommendations only if they have 
an interest in doing so – and in this case, the recommendation will have a clear effect on third 
parties, the promoters of PCIs. Fresa argues that NRAs tend to agree to a CBCA compliant with 
Recommendation 7/2013 only if none of them is a net loser from the process.81 While this 
might undermine consistency,82 it is hard to build a court case against the NRAs claiming they 
did not observe the recommendation. At the same time, if brought to Court, recommendation 
7/2013 would probably not be justiciable, and this even though sometimes it has important 
consequences with regards to allocating costs for projects of common interest in energy. 
The immediate solutions to this lack of justiciability relate to situations when 
recommendations such as recommendation 7/2013 find their way into binding instruments, 
which can be relied on/ brought in front of the Court. This can happen in two ways. First, the 
Agency Regulation provides for ways to make such recommendations legally binding through 
Commission endorsement or ACER decisions. According to Article 7 (3), ACER can recommend 
the European Commission to adopt binding rules on the cooperation between national 
regulatory authorities. Such binding rules can in principle be the object of judicial review. 
Moreover, these recommendations might find their way into ACER decisions. For instance, in 
the example above regarding interconnection projects, the decision on the CBCA belongs to 
the beneficiary NRAs, and the intervention of ACER is required only if the NRAs concerned fail 
to reach an agreement on the investment request. This happened for the project regarding 
the Gas Interconnection between Poland and Lithuania. ACER noted in its decision83 that the 
proposed CBCA deviated from its Recommendation 7/2013, and proceeded to set the cost 
allocation according to the latter instrument. Eventual claims against Recommendation 
7/2013 can be made therefore in a potential action against the ACER decision.  
  
                                                          
79 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt EU:C:2011:389, 21-22; Case C-23/14 Post Danmark, 
EU:C:2015:651 para 52. 
80 Commission recommendations were recently found not to be justiciable, despite the calls for a change in 
approach from the Advocate General (Case C-16/16 Belgium v Commission EU:C:2018:79). 
81 L Meeus and N Keyaerts, ‘First series of cross-border cost allocation decisions for projects of common interest: 
main lessons learned’ (2015), available at 
http://fsr.eui.eu/Documents/PolicyBrief/Energy/2015/PB2015.01digital.pdf.  
82 S Fresa, ‘Multilevel EU Governance in Energy Infrastructure Development: A New Role for ACER?’ (2015) 16, 
available online http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/diw_01.c.508434.de/fresa.pdf.  
83 ‘Decision of the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators No 01/2014 of 11th August 2014 on the 
investment request including cross-border cost allocation for the gas interconnection Poland- Lithuania project 
of common interest No 8.5’, published on ACER’s official website and available at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Individual%20decisions/ACER%20Indivi
dual%20Decision%2001-2014.pdf , last checked on 26th February 2018. 
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B) Compatibility of technical rules 
Art 5 of the Electricity Directive provides that ACER may also make recommendations towards 
achieving compatibility of technical rules adopted by the Member States on safety criteria and 
on design and operational requirements with principles such as interoperability of the 
systems, objectivity and non-discrimination. ACER may make (not binding) recommendations 
towards achieving the compatibility of all these technical rules, thus having the potential to 
foster the development of consistent technical specifications throughout Europe. In principle, 
given their lack of legally binding force, these recommendations are not justiciable. However, 
they are giving expression to general principles of law, such as consistency84 in the application 
of the energy legal framework in the EU. The argument is that, in the interest of consistency, 
national authorities should be bound by EU guidance, hence such instruments produce effects 
that make them reviewable by a Court of law. However, such points did not have, to date, 
much success in front of the ECJ, as recently confirmed in cases such Expedia.85  
C) Opinions on decisions taken by the NRAs 
ACER also exercises oversight in relation to the compliance of decisions taken by the NRAs 
with the energy regulatory framework. According to Article 7 of the Agency Regulation, ACER 
can provide an opinion, based on matters of fact, at the request of a regulatory authority or 
the Commission, on whether a decision taken by a regulatory authority complies with the 
guidelines issued under or the provisions of the Electricity and Gas Regulations and Directives. 
ACER does not have the initiative of this compliance control – that can be undertaken solely 
upon request by an NRA or the Commission. Furthermore, ACER has no decision-making 
power in case of non-compliance, but can only voice its view on the conformity of a certain 
decision with the regulatory framework. In case the NRA disregards the opinion, ACER cannot 
impose any sanctions; it can only inform the Member State concerned and the Commission.  
The opinions on compliance of NRA decisions are thus clearly not legally binding. Recent case 
law confirms that, therefore, neither are they justiciable. The Polish regulator requested an 
Article 7 opinion from ACER after NRAs from Central Europe failed to provide for a capacity 
allocation procedure on the German-Austrian border. Arguably, this failure resulted in 
significant power flows through the transmission grids in neighboring countries. 86 In its 
opinion, ACER agreed with the Polish regulator, and recommended the Central European 
NRAs to undertake a series of measures to ensure compliance with the Electricity Regulation. 
The Austrian regulator, E-Control, brought claims both in front of the General Court and in 
front of the ACER Board of Appeal. The General Court dismissed the action in an order,87 and 
                                                          
84 On consistency as general principle of EU law see E Herlin-Karnell and T Konstadinides, ‘The Rise and 
Expressions of Consistency in EU Law: Legal and Strategic Implications for European Integration’ (2013) 15 
Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 139-167.  
85 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc. v Autorité de la concurrence and others, [2012] EU:C:2012:795. 
86 Traditionally, the territory of Austria, Germany, and Luxembourg represented one sole bidding zone for 
electricity. Recently, calls have been made for that zone to split, given the significant power flows through the 
transmission grids in neighbouring countries. (See also ACER Decision No 06/2016 of 17 November 2016 on the 
Electricity Transmission System Operators’ Proposal for the Determination of Capacity Calculation Regions 
currently challenged by E-Control in the pending case Case T-332/17). 
87 Order in Case T-671/15, Energie-Control Austria für die Regulierung der Elektrizitäts- und Erdgaswirtschaft (E-
Control) v Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators, [2016], EU:T:2016:626. 
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the ACER Board of Appeal also rejected E-Control’s claim on the grounds that the contested 
opinion did not have binding legal effects.88 E-Control followed up with judicial proceedings 
against the decision of the Board, but the General Court did not find, in its judgment, any error 
in law or infringement of rights of defense.89 The E-control judgment and order confirmed 
that, in the absence of binding legal effects, the contested opinion could neither be reviewed 
by ACER’s Board of Appeal, nor form the object of a claim for judicial review. 
These cases are important not only for the discussion concerning the justiciability of non 
binding instruments issued by ACER, but for the wider academic debate on soft law, namely 
the taxonomy of soft law and of its legal effects. In order to establish justiciability of the ACER 
opinion, E-Control submitted two arguments related to the taxonomy of soft law: first, the 
opinion was a final document, not a preparatory one; second, that the opinion was an 
instrument that could be assimilated to Commission communications, often submitted to 
judicial review. With regards to the first argument, in its order, the Court agreed with the 
applicant, while noting that it does not review preparatory instruments (which can eventually 
be reviewed in actions against final decisions). Since ACER’s opinion set out final legal 
assessments, it could not be a preparatory act, but neither was it a reviewable act under Art 
263 TFEU as it did not set out any obligations for national regulatory authorities. The E-control 
order is important for the debate on the taxonomy of soft law as it constitutes a judicial 
acknowledgement of the category of preparatory instruments90. With regards to the 
applicant’s second argument, the Court disagreed. It noted that, unlike the communications 
reviewed in the judgments cited by the applicant, ACER’s opinion had a specific legal basis 
which provided for the adoption of non-binding instruments (art 7 (4) of the ACER Regulation). 
This indicates that there might be, after all, a distinction between soft law instruments 
mentioned in Article 288 TFEU (recommendations and opinions) and other instruments not 
mentioned by the Treaty (communications, notices, frameworks, etc.) Given their legal basis, 
the former may be considered prima facie as non-legally binding and not justiciable, while the 
latter are subject to closer scrutiny. 
Affording such importance to the form, not to the content of the instrument in the legal 
analysis is surprising.91 However, the order in E-Control does go into a discussion of the legal 
effects of the ACER opinion, by looking at the established criteria: wording and context, 
substance, and the intention of the author. The analysis is concerned less by the actual legal 
effects of the instrument at stake and more by determining whether the instrument is an 
opinion within Article 7 (4) of the Electricity Regulation. The Court outlines that Article 7 (4) 
opinions are only one among various other procedures envisaged to ensure the compliance 
                                                          
88 Decision of ACER’s Board of Appeal No A-001-2015 of 16th December 2015, available at 
https://www.acer.europa.eu/en/The_agency/Organisation/Board_of_Appeal/Decisions/238%20A-001-
2015%20BoA%20decision%20(non%20confidential%20version)%202112-2112.pdf, last checked on 23rd 
February 2018. 
89 Case T-63/16 Energie-Control Austria für die Regulierung der Elektrizitäts- und Erdgaswirtschaft (E-Control) v 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators [2016], EU:T:2017:456. 
90 M Eliantonio, ‘Judicial Review in an Integrated Administration: the Case of ‘Composite Procedures’ (2015) 7(2) 
Review Of European Administrative Law, 65-102 
91 The mantra of the Court with regards to judicial review being that ‘an action for annulment must […] be 
available in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their nature or form, which are 
intended to have legal effects’ – cit. para 42 of case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council 
of the European Communities. European Agreement on Road Transport. [1971], EU:C:1971:32 
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of NRAs decisions with the electricity market legislation, and that, given their legal basis, they 
are supposed to be not legally binding. This is by contrast to the binding decisions that ACER 
can issue in the limited cases provided for in Article 7 (1) of the Agency Regulation. It is the 
Commission who has the competence to issue decisions if the NRAs do not comply with the 
opinions issued by ACER under Article 7 (4). Therefore, binding effects are attached only to 
Commission decisions, and cannot ‘flow from the opinion adopted by ACER, even though that 
opinion may, in certain circumstances, be a prerequisite for the adoption of the Commission 
decision’92 (and therefore have, in practice, important effects). 
Following analysis, the Court held that the wording, the context, the substance of the 
contested opinion as well as ACER’s intention, all show that this was an Article 7(4) opinion, 
which meant it was not legally binding nor justiciable. Legal effects and justiciability become 
thus a function of the legal basis of the act. This can be contrasted with case law such as 
Clearing Houses, where the Court looks at the wording and context of non-legally binding 
instruments to determine whether the parties concerned could reasonably have perceived the 
act to be legally binding. No such analysis is present in the E-Control Order, and, what is more, 
the Court dismisses the argument according to which voluntary compliance with the ACER 
opinion of stake might be indicative of (perceived) binding effects and thus a potential trigger 
of justiciability.93 
The order in E-Control shows once again that, notwithstanding the possibility that soft law has 
some legal relevance by providing ‘final legal assessments including legal requirements’,94 
instruments which do not set out, expressly, rights or obligations cannot be subject to judicial 
review. Striking the distinction between instruments providing legal assessments and 
instruments setting out rights and obligations is not straightforward. One may wonder 
whether, in the interest of judicial protection, a more profound scrutiny of the way in which 
the instrument might be perceived by interested parties should have been performed.95 The 
opinions provided in Article 7 (4) of the Agency Regulation can be de facto binding for the 
NRAs, as they are issued under the shadow of potential infringement proceedings: Article 7 
(5) provides that ACER should dully inform the Commission of non-compliance. Consequently, 
it might be expected that the Commission will follow up, potentially with infringement 
proceedings under Art 258 TFEU. What is more, evidence presented in E-Control showed that 
the disputed opinion was taken on board in subsequent documents from the ENTSOs, and 
endorsed by certain NRAs who expressed the will to voluntarily comply. 96 Despite all these 
legal consequences, both the Court and ACER’s Board of appeal refused to review the opinion 
on grounds of lack of binding legal effects.  
Administrative and judicial review are thus situated at a remote end. Opinions such as the one 
at stake in E-control will not be reviewed by ACER’s Board of appeal even though they may 
produce important practical effects. More concretely, E-control is essentially a case about how 
bidding zones should be split in Europe, which would entail important consequences, for 
example on electricity market wholesale prices, impacting a wide range of stakeholders. Given 
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the lack of binding force, such opinions will not be the object of judicial review either. An 
oversight of Art 7 (4) opinions might be triggered only if NRAs refuse to comply with the 
provisions thereof. Only in cases of non-compliance the matter is brought to the attention of 
the Commission, according to Article 7 (5) of the Agency Regulation. The Commission will 
potentially review ACER’s opinion before deciding to initiate further proceedings. And it is only 
if the Commission decides to follow up with infringement proceedings that ACER’s opinion 
might end up on the desk of a judge. Would the Agency be granted the power to issue binding 
decisions in the cases envisaged by Art 7(4), defense rights could be easily ensured at a very 
early stage of the process, and would not depend on an additional assessment or review from 
the European Commission in order to be effective. 
4.3.2 Recommendations and opinions on the work of the ENTSOs 
ACER has a monitoring role also in relation to the ENTSOs. It monitors the way in which binding 
or non-binding network codes are implemented by the ENTSOs. Furthermore, it oversees the 
adoption of common network operation tools,97 of a non-binding EU-wide 10-year network 
development plan,98 of recommendations on the cooperation with third countries, 99 of the 
ENTSOs annual work programme100 and annual report,101 as well as the annual summer and 
winter generation adequacy outlooks.102 ACER is then accountable for this monitoring role to 
the Commission. 
The procedure is as follows. First, the ENTSOs submit to ACER drafts, and second, ACER 
provides an opinion on these documents, checking in particular the conformity with principles 
such as non-discrimination, effective competition and the efficient and secure functioning of 
the internal markets in electricity and natural gas.103 ACER needs to also report on this 
monitoring activities to the European Commission. ACER will then provide an opinion on all 
documents mentioned in Art 8(3) of the Electricity and Gas Regulations and their compliance 
with the above principles and the legislative framework. Moreover, ACER will provide a duly 
reasoned opinion and recommendations to the ENTSOs and the EU institutions when it 
considers that the annual work programme and the 10 year network development plan do not 
contribute to non-discrimination, effective competition or the efficient functioning of the 
market.  
The Agency also double checks the compatibility of the Community wide network 
development plan with the 10 years national development plans, overseen by the NRAs. 104 In 
this regard, ACER can suggest amendments if it spots inconsistencies between these 
documents105. The legislative framework is silent as to where to submit such 
recommendations and no formal procedures are triggered by the discovery of inconsistencies. 
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However, as interpreted by Ermacora, ACER could potentially address these 
recommendations to the Commission, Council and the EP as well.106 
It is interesting to note that these opinions and recommendations shall be based on ‘matters 
of fact’, in accordance to Art 9.2 of the Electricity and Gas Regulations. The Council proposed 
this formulation during the second reading, as a result of the opposition by some Member 
States to task ACER with legal assessments and compliance checks.107 As Ermacora points out, 
such distinction is without practical relevance, given that legal assessments are generally 
based on matters of fact. However, this opposition might reflect the lack of political will to 
grant the Agency some say in legal matters, and consequently subject its acts to judicial 
review. It remains to be seen whether the Court would decide to exercise review over this 
type of instruments. The argument that is made generally against the justiciability of soft law 
addressed to regulatory authorities is that such instruments do not create rights or obligations 
for the individuals.108 However, these recommendations are directly addressed to the TSOs, 
making suggestions as to whether the documents that they drafted are in line with the energy 
legislative framework. A case can thus be made potentially in favor of justiciability, if TSOs 
manage to prove that their rights and obligations might be affected by such 
recommendations. 
4.4 REMIT Soft Law 
As mentioned in Section 3, ACER is involved in the implementation of the REMIT Regulation, 
which deals with monitoring market integrity and transparency, in order to detect eventual 
market manipulation. Among others, ACER has set up an online portal on the REMIT 
information system (ARIS), which will enable market participants to report transactions as 
provided for in the Regulation and implementing acts. NRAs undertake monitoring at the 
national level, and REMIT provides for close cooperation between them and ACER in order to 
ensure proper monitoring and transparency of energy markets. While the NRAs have specific 
investigation and enforcement duties under REMIT, ACER acts as a coordinator of these tasks. 
REMIT also creates links with other agencies, as it imposes obligations to inform European 
Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) wherever there is suspicion that market abuse might 
affect financial instruments.  
More interestingly for this paper, ACER can publish non-binding guidance on the definitions 
set out in the REMIT Regulation,109 which should address, inter alia, the issue of accepted 
market practices.110 Such guidance belongs to the category of interpretative soft law111 is 
directed to NRAs in order to ensure coordination and consistency in their monitoring activities 
under the Regulation. The Agency published so far four editions of this guidance, starting in 
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2011, with the most recent update dating back to June 2016.112 It has been observed that 
ACER adopted guidance in all areas of REMIT, and not only in the areas defined in Article 16(1) 
of the REMIT Regulation.113 With regards to legal effects, as mentioned on the site of ACER as 
well as in an ‘important notice’ at the start of the Guidance, it is ‘deliberately drafted using 
non-legal terminology and does not provide an interpretation of REMIT. It is made public for 
transparency purposes only.’ Given all these disclaimers, the Guidance seems to be a 
particularly weak form of soft law, if it is soft law at all, because it is expressly meant not to 
have legal value, nor to interpret REMIT.  
While practical effects of REMIT guidance can be important, can influence decisions by 
administrations or even courts in individual cases, 114 soft law issued in this context might also 
escape judicial review. In the absence of specific case law, if one looks at corresponding soft 
law in the competition area, it might be argued that instruments issued to foster the respect 
of general principles of law, such as transparency - might have certain legal effects. Indeed, it 
has been often pointed out that soft law plays an important role in creating links between the 
institutions and individuals, natural or legal persons, thus enhancing legal certainty and 
transparency of administrative activity. Through these instruments, institutions explain the 
existing law in a specific sector, present their views on the law and clarify those provisions of 
an open and indeterminate character.115 In this context, Snyder talked about ‘regulation by 
publication’116 and Hoffman about ‘regulation by information’.117 Thus, soft law is meant to 
help the individuals to understand what the law is, what the boundaries of their actions should 
be and what they should expect in case of infractions. Furthermore, soft law can help national 
authorities understand and implement EU law, thus connecting the EU and the national levels 
of governance and creating the premises for a uniform and consistent application of European 
hard law. 
All these considerations were taken into account in the competition case law. The Courts 
constructed a mechanism based on general principles of law in order to recognize the legal 
effects of soft law instruments. As laid down in cases such Dansk Rørindustri, by publishing 
soft law, the Commission imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart 
from those rules under risk of being found to be in breach of the general principles of law such 
as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations.118 However, it is difficult to 
apply this line of case law to REMIT soft law. First, even in competition, the Court was not 
ready to extend this case law to recognize binding effects of guidance for national regulatory 
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authorities.119 Second, unlike the European Commission, ACER does not have the competence 
to issue binding decisions. ACER can conduct market investigations on wholesale energy 
markets involving several MS where abuse of dominance contrary to the competition rules is 
suspected. Specifically, where it suspects that REMIT has been breached, ACER may ask NRAs 
to supply information, to commence investigations, to take appropriate actions to remedy the 
breach, and set up and coordinate investigatory groups in case there is suspicion of cross-
border impact. The responsibility for binding legal action however lies with the NRAs and not 
ACER. It is difficult, therefore, to export the competition case law recognizing effects to soft 
law through the operation of principles of law to REMIT soft law issued by ACER, even if these 
too are interpretative instruments aimed at increasing transparency. 
Conclusion 
Following a strict application of the Meroni doctrine, ACER was granted limited powers and 
issues mainly non legally binding material (or soft law). As seen above, in the absence of 
binding effects, most of these instruments are neither justiciable, nor reviewable by the ACER 
Board of Appeal. This raises problems with regards to important principles laid down in 
Meroni: accountability and institutional balance. Such problems are of particular salience 
given the context of the complicated system of delegation and re-delegation of power in 
energy, coupled with the fuzzy boundaries of shared competences. Furthermore, the current 
system has important deficiencies, from a consistency and clarity point of view, which 
increases the need for judicial review. 
Several solutions can be envisaged to settle this conundrum. For example, more powers could 
be granted to ACER to issue legally binding material, going beyond the cosmetic upgrade done 
by the Winter Package. However, such solution is politically impossible,120 and runs counter 
the tenet that only non-discretionary powers can be granted to the Agency, provided that the 
applicability perimeter related to the changes inferred from Short Selling is debatable. 
Another solution would be for the Courts and (or at least) the Board of Regulators to have a 
nuanced approach to assessing legal effects, and review instruments that are, de facto, 
binding such as the contested opinion in E-control. However, this might be considered a 
stretch with regards to the range of reviewable acts provided for by the Treaty, in which case 
one could advocate for a more prominent role of the national courts in ensuring control and 
judicial protection. As argued by Türk,121 the preliminary reference procedure and/or the pleas 
in illegality under Article 277 TFEU might provide a solution absent the conditions for direct 
actions against certain soft law instruments. The argument is that the wording of what 
constitutes a reviewable act is wider under Articles 267 and 277 TFEU than under Article 263 
TFEU. Thus, while the effects of non-legally binding instruments are too weak to be caught by 
direct actions, they are strong enough to trigger judicial review in preliminary rulings or pleas 
of illegality.  
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However, judicial review is hardly a panacea for modern ills of regulation, and one may 
wonder whether Courts are the most appropriate fora to settle matters in such 
interdisciplinary sectors as energy. It must be recalled that most of the documents issued by 
ACER, with or without the cooperation of the NRAs or the TSOs, are very technical in nature. 
Law might very well reach its limits when stepping on the ground of engineers, with judicial 
review confined to existing boundaries of expertise. Furthermore, the procedural 
requirements against which Courts might check these instruments are not always clearly 
outlined in the legislation – as is the case with most EU agencies.122 Ironically perhaps the 
ACER Rules of Procedure are not legally binding – hence all soft law drawbacks concerning will 
apply.123 In the current regulatory framework, it appears that the heavy burden of control 
rests with the European Commission, who can have the last say on matters ranging from 
network codes to the application of ACER opinions.  
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